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Abstract
Paid placement, where advertisers bid payments to a search engine to have their
products appear next to keyword search results, has emerged as a predominant form of
advertising on the Internet. This paper studies a product-di¤erentiation model where
consumers are initially uncertain about the desirability of and valuation for di¤erent
sellersproducts, and can learn about a sellers product through a costly search. In
equilibrium, a seller bids more for placement when his product is more relevant for a
given keyword, and the paid placement of sellers by the search engine reveals information
about the relevance of their products. This results in e¢ cient (sequential) search by
consumers and increases total output.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Paid placement, online advertising in which links to advertisersproducts appear next to
keyword search results, has emerged as a predominant form of Internet advertising, gen-
erating $8.2 billion ad revenues in 2005 (Satagopan et al. 2005). Under paid placement
advertising, sellers (advertisers) bid payments to a search engine to be placed on its rec-
ommended list for a keyword search. A group of advertisers who bid more than the rest
are selected for placement, and their positions of placement reect their order of bids, with
the highest bidder placed at the top position. The rapid growth of paid placement adver-
tising has made it one of the most important Internet institutions, and has led to enormous
commercial successes for search engines. For example, Google, which derives most of its
revenue from paid placement advertising, has a market capitalization of $123.24 billion;
by contrast, the combined market capitalization of the big three US auto manufacturers is
$83.54 billion.1 Despite the popularity and importance of the phenomenon, the economics of
the online market with paid placement advertising has received little formal study. How do
sellers form their bidding strategies? How does paid placement advertising a¤ect consumer
search and welfare? And what determines the revenues of a search engine in equilibrium?
We develop a market equilibrium model that addresses these questions in this paper.
We consider a game in which di¤erentiated sellers rst bid payments to a search engine
to be placed on its list of search outcomes associated with a particular keyword (product).
Only a small number of sellers are listed due to limited number of positions available on the
list. Sellers di¤er in their relevance,which we model as the probability that any consumer
will nd a sellers product to be her desired variety. Each consumer is ex ante uncertain
about which sellers product will match her preference and how much she is willing to pay
for the product. By searching (inspecting) a sellers website, the consumer will learn about
the sellers product and price. But there are search costs to inspect a sellers website; hence
a consumer needs to form a search strategy, and, if a search yields a match, a purchase
1These gures are based on stock quotes on September 21, 2006. The market capitalizations for General
Motors, Ford, DaimlerChrysler AG are $17.52 billion, $14.75 billion, and $51.27 billion, respectively.
2
strategy. On the other hand, sellers take into account consumers search and purchase
behavior when choosing pricing and bidding strategies. In equilibrium, a seller bids more
for placement when his product is more relevant for a given keyword, and the paid placement
of sellers by the search engine reveals information about the relevance of di¤erent sellers.
This results in e¢ cient (sequential) search by consumers and increases total output.
A distinctive feature of our model is that rms sell di¤erentiated products online. As such
our approach is very di¤erent from those in the literature of Internet market, where rms are
assumed to sell homogeneous goods (e.g., Baye and Morgan, 2001; Iyer and Pazgal, 2003;
He and Chen, 2006). In our model, consumers search for their desired product varieties,
and a search engine serves as a useful intermediary that provides information about the
relevance of di¤erent sellersproducts.2 This view of the role played by search engines is
consistent with industry observations. It has been noticed that consumers are increasingly
turning to search engines for their information needs, with tra¢ c rising from 133 billion
searches in 2004 to a projected 162 billion in 2010 (Satagopan et al. 2005). According to
WebSideStory, a San Diego research rm, 90% of shopping searches originate at the top four
search sites, Google, Yahoo, AOL and MSN, all of which o¤er paid placement advertising
(Frangos 2002). Unlike other studies in the literature on Internet search and pricing, in our
model sellers use pure strategies in setting prices, and, when sellers di¤er in their marginal
costs, there is equilibrium price dispersion under pure strategies.
The auction of ad placement by search engines has been studied in a recent paper by
Edelman et al. (2005), which demonstrates that the auction mechanism for paid-placement
advertising is one of generalized second price auction.3 We also model the auction as a
second price auction, where a winning bidder for an ad position pays the next highest bid;
2 In addition to the papers just mentioned, other studies on Internet retailing and Internet institutions
include Lal and Sarvary (1999)s investigation of the conditions under which Internet may soften price compe-
tition, and the examination by Zettelmeyer et al. (2001) on how Internet intermediary such as Autobytel.com
and Carpoint.com a¤ects consumer and rm behaviors.
3An interesting anecdote is that when Edelman et al. (2005) show that paid-placement search engines
adopt second price auction in the bidding process, Hal Varian, who consulted for Google, acknowledged the
validity of their nding (Coy 2006).
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but a major di¤erence in our analysis is that we embed the bidding process in a market
game where consumerssearch and purchase decisions, as well as sellerspricing decisions,
are all determined endogenously. Consequently, the values of sellers in being placed on
the ad list and being placed at di¤erent positions are endogenous.4 Interestingly, once the
equilibrium values of di¤erent ad slots for di¤erent sellers are computed, a winning bidder
for an ad slot bids his value from obtaining that slot, same as in a regular second price
auction.
Our model is also related to the literature on advertising. Advertising in our model
conveys product information, as, for instance, in Nelson (1974), Grossman and Shapiro
(1984), Meurer and Stahl (1994), and Anderson and Renault (2006). The information
conveyed by the ads through paid placement, however, is about the relevance of a sellers
product relative to a particular keyword search and is thus unique to the Internet institution.
Advertising by the sellers acts as a device to coordinate consumer search, and the more
consumers a seller can attract in turn enable the seller to bid more payment to be placed by
the search engine. Since its the more relevant seller who can benet more from attracting
more consumers to visit its website, in equilibrium the more relevant sellers indeed bid
more and are placed higher on the search engines list, and it would indeed be rational for a
consumer to search based on paid-placement advertising to nd her desired product. This is
related to the result in Bagwell and Ramey (1994), where advertising coordinates consumers
to search stores that have lower marginal costs, and hence lower prices; and expecting more
consumers, these stores indeed have the incentive to invest in reducing marginal costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model. Section
3 studies market equilibrium. We characterize consumersequilibrium search and purchase
decisions, and rmsequilibrium pricing and bidding strategies. Section 4 extends the basic
model to allow sellers to have di¤erent costs, which generates price dispersion under pure
strategies. Section 5 concludes.
4For studies of auctions with endogenous valuations, see, for instance, Lewis (1983), Krishna (1993), and
Chen (2000).
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2. BASIC MODEL
2.1 Institutional Characteristics
Google AdWords and Yahoo Search Marketing are leaders in paid-placement advertising.
Microsoft recently joined the foray and launched MSN adCenter in October 2005. A common
trait of the paid-placement search engines is the emphasis on relevance of advertisement to
the keyword consumers use. If Internet users suddenly see a large amount of irrelevant
search results pages that have nothing to do with their search, they might leave that search
engine for another. This is exactly what paid-placement search engines are trying to avoid
at all costs. For instance, Overture rejects close to 30% of keyword applications or ad
listings that are submitted to them over a period of time (Thibodeau 2004).5
Google is thus far the champion of paid-placement advertising. It handles paid advertise-
ment listings for its own site and online behemoth AOL, as well as AskJeeves and Earthlink.
These paid listings are links that appear not within the search results, but rather as a col-
ored box to the right of the page. Ad buyers do not get guaranteed placement. The listings
appear somewhere, but they might not be at the top of the list of advertisements. They
will not appear at all on the non-Google sites in the ad network if enough other advertisers
have paid more or have more popular sites. That is because Google determines listing order
based on the amount the advertiser is willing to pay per click-through and the number of
clicks the ad gets. The idea is to promote the most relevant ads as Google sees it to its
users.
2.2 Preliminaries
Consider a consumer who wants to buy a necklace. She needs to choose among a number
of features: style, color, material, to name just a few. The choices the consumer needs
to make can be mind boggling. Fortunately, she is computer savvy. Like many other
consumers, she searches Google to nd her desired product. Depending on her level of
5Overture has been acquired by Yahoo in 2005 and is now Yahoo Search Marketing.
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product knowledge and how well-dened her preferences are, she can use keywords such as
pearl necklace,freshwater pearl necklace,white cultured freshwater pearl necklaceto
initiate her search. Hundreds of online sellers o¤er pearl necklace, although the number and
type of varieties they carry di¤er. For instance, a seller may carry more varieties so that a
consumer has a better chance nding her desired product from it. The problem is that the
consumer may not know which seller is more relevant for her interests; and without the help
of paid-placement advertising, a sellers chance of reaching this consumer is rather small. If,
however, a seller appears in the colored box to the right of the consumers search results, its
chance of reaching the consumer is much higher. The seller can realize a sale if the consumer
nds her desired product among the sellers o¤ering, although she does not know exactly
which pearl necklace suits her the best before searching. In this environment, sellers need
to gure out how to place bids to maximize their prots, a search engine (such as Google)
needs to choose a prot-maximizing method to arrange the ad placement, and consumers
need to form an optimal search strategy. All of these have implications on the properties
of paid placement as an internet institution, in its e¤ects on rm prots, consumer welfare,
and e¢ ciency. In what follows, we construct a parsimonious model to capture the essence of
the paid-placement mechanism, to illuminate the strategic interactions between the players
involved, and to shed light on the managerial and e¢ ciency implications of the mechanism.
2.3 Assumptions and Model Setup
There are m  3 di¤erentiated sellers, selling to a unit mass of consumers at a constant
marginal cost c. Later, we relax this assumption and allow marginal costs to di¤er across
sellers in Section 4. Given a particular keyword, the m sellers products have di¤erent
relevancefor the consumers. With probability i seller is product matches the preference
of any randomly chosen consumer, in which case the consumers valuation for the sellers
product is v; which is the realization of a random variable with cdf F (v) and pdf f (v)
on [v; v] ; where 0  v < v ; with probability 1   i seller is product does not match the
preference of the consumer, in which case the consumers valuation for the sellers product
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is zero. A consumer learns about her v only when she nds the desired product. We call
i the match (or relevance) probability of seller i; and make the technical assumption that
i is independent of F (v) ; and is independent and identical for every consumer.
Each sellers match probability is her private information. Without loss of generality, let
1  2  : : :  m;
and refer seller i as seller type i: Thus each seller has private information about his type i,
although the distribution of seller types and possible values of i are common knowledge.
For convenience, we shall assume
i =
8<: i 1 for i = 1; 2; : : : ; II for i = I + 1; : : : ;m ;
where ;  2 (0; 1) and 2  I  m: Thus the match probability decreases among the sellers
at a constant rate  for I sellers, then it becomes constant for the rest of the sellers: We
denote seller i by Si:
Each consumer is ex ante uncertain about which sellers product is desirable for her
preference. She also does not know the match probability of any particular seller. But she
can nd out whether the sellers product is what she desires by visiting the sellers website.
She can also decide which sellerswebsites to visit by rst searching through a search engine
with a keyword for the product, and the search engine then shows a list of paid advertising
sellers. Note that there is horizontal di¤erentiation between di¤erent product varieties; but
sellers are di¤erentiated by their di¤erent relevance (matching probabilities). A seller could
be more relevant simply because he carries a higher number of product variety. A seller
can choose to pay the search engine, denoted as E; to be included in the list. E has n  m
positions in the list, E1; E2; : : : ; En; that it can auction to the sellers in a second price
auction, where the seller who bids the most gets listed the highest (at E1) and pays the
second highest bid, the seller who bids the second highest gets listed the second highest (at
E2) and pays the third highest bid, and so on. In other words, let the bids of the sellers in
descending order be bj ; j = 1; : : : ;m: Then sellers Sj will be included in the list with the
order j = 1; 2; : : : ; n. For convenience, we assume n = 3 = I; although it is straightforward
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to extend our analysis to any arbitrary n and I: Thus, by assumption E has three positions
on its list for paid placement, E1; E2; and E3; and i = 
i 1 for i = 1; 2; 3 but i = 3
for i  4:
The timing of the game is as follows. Sellers, having learned their private i; rst bid to be
listed on E: The chosen sellers are listed on E: Sellers then simultaneously and independently
choose their prices, which are not observed by any consumer until the consumer searches the
sellers website. Consumers then decide whether and how to search the websites, and they
may possibly use information from E0s list. There are costs for consumers to search the
websites of sellers. The cost for each consumer to conduct her j0th search is tj ; j = 1; : : : ;m:
A consumer makes a unit purchase if and when she nds her desired product, the price does
not exceed her realized v; and searching further does not yield a higher expected surplus
for her. All players are risk neutral. We make the following technical assumptions:
A1. There is a unique po such that
po = arg max
p2[c;u]
(p  c) [1  F (p)] : (1)
A2.
tj =
8<: t for j = 1; 2; 3; 4th for j > 4 ; (2)
where
t < 3
vZ
po
(v   po) f (v) dv < th: (3)
A su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition for A1 is that the hazard rate f(p)1 F (p) is monoton-
ically increasing. This monotonic hazard rate condition is satised for many familiar dis-
tributions, such as uniform, exponential, and normal distributions. We dene
o  (po   c) [1  F (po)] : (4)
A2 captures the idea that a consumers marginal search cost becomes higher after some
searches, perhaps due to capacity constraintin her time that can be used for search; this
simplies the analysis of consumer search, but is otherwise not essential for our results.
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3. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
A prole of strategies in our model consists of a search and purchase strategy by each
consumer, a bidding strategy by seller Si; and a pricing strategy by seller Si. After observing
the placement of sellers, buyers have beliefs about the relevance (type) of di¤erent sellers.
An equilibrium (perfect Bayesian equilibrium) is a prole of strategies, together with a
system of beliefs by buyers, such that each player is optimizing, and buyers beliefs are
consistent with the strategies and placement of sellers.
We start our analysis with consumerssearch strategies. Suppose that the sellers placed
on Es list are in the order of their relevance, namely that Si takes the positions of Ei for
i = 1; 2; 3: Suppose further that all sellers set their prices equal to po: Then, a consumers
expected return from searching Ei is
i 1
vZ
po
(v   po) f (v) dv; for i = 1; 2; 3;
and her expected return from searching any randomly selected seller not listed on E is
3
vZ
po
(v   po) f (v) dv:
Since
t < 3
vZ
po
(v   po) f (v) dv < th:
from A2; it is optimal for each consumer to search sequentially, in the order of E1; E2; E3;
and then one randomly selected seller not listed on E: She stops searching either if she nds
her desired product or if she has conducted these four searches without nding her desired
product. When the consumer nds that a sellers product matches her needs, she purchases
the product if v  po; and does not purchase if v < po: Since her v is the same for the
desired product from any seller, she will not conduct additional search once her search has
yielded a match.
We therefore have:
9
Lemma 1 Suppose that S1; S2; S3 are placed on Es list in descending order and other
sellers are not placed on the list. Suppose further that each sellers price is po: Then it is
optimal for each consumer to search sequentially E1; E2; E3 and then one randomly selected
seller not listed on E: She stops searching either when she nds her desired product, in
which case she purchases if and only if v  po; or when she has conducted these four
searches without nding her desired product.
We next consider sellers pricing strategies, given consumers search and purchase be-
havior described in Lemma 1. If a sellers product matches a consumers needs, then the
sellers price that maximizes his expected prot from this consumer, without knowing the
consumers realized v; is po: Since a consumer will purchase the sellers product if v  po;
po must be the optimal price for the seller,6 independent of whether the seller is listed on
E or what his position on E is.
Therefore, given consumerssearch and purchase behavior described in Lemma 1, if S1; S2;
and S3 are placed at E1; E2; and E3; the expected prots of Si; excluding their payments
to E; are
1 = 
o
2 = (1  ) o = (1  ) 1
3 = (1  ) (1  ) 2o = (1  ) 2
k =
1
m 3
 
1  2 (1  ) (1  ) 3o = 1 2m 3 3; for k = 4; : : : ;m:
(5)
We notice that the analysis of bidding strategies here di¤ers from the usual second price
auction, since there are multiple positions to be auctioned, and the values of E2; E3 and
not winning the bid are endogenous for the bidders, depending on who will be placed at
the di¤erent positions. To determine how each seller will bid to be placed on E; we look
for an equilibrium where b1 > b2 > b3 > bk for k = 4; : : : ;m; and Si (i = 1; 2; 3) bids the
6This is a familiar result in the search literature, following the seminal work of Diamond (1971). Our
model captures the situation where consumerssearch for relevance dominates search for price. Our analysis
does not depend crucially on each rm charging po: The qualitative nature of our results will be the same
as long as rmsoptimal price is a constant, or, as we show in Section 4, the distribution of rmsprices are
within a su¢ ciently small interval relative to consumerssearch costs.
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value of being placed at Ei: In such a possible equilibrium, given the placement rule and
consumerssearch behavior, S4s expected prot from not being placed on Es list is 4: If
S4 is placed at E3 to replace S3s position, his expected prot would be
(1  ) (1  ) 3o = 3:
Therefore S4 is willing to bid
4  3   4 = 3  
 
1  2 
m  33 =

1  1  
2
m  3

3
to be placed at E3: On the other hand, to keep his current position, S3 is willing to bid
3 = 3   (1  ) (1  )
 
1  3 2
m  3
o =

1  1  
3
m  3

3:
We have
3  4 =

1  1  
3
m  3

3  

1  1  
2
m  3

3 =
(1  ) (m  4)
(m  3)  0;
where the inequality holds strictly if m > 4: Thus, if S3 bids 3; the increase of his prot
from not on E to at E3; or the value of E3 to him, is 3. Taking as given the proposed
equilibrium placement, S3 outbids S4 for E3: The expected payo¤ for S3 at this proposed
equilibrium would be 3  4:
For S2; his expected payo¤ to be placed at E3 would be
(1  )  1  2 o  4:
To keep his position at E2; S2 is thus willing to bid
2 = 2  

(1  )  1  2 o  4
= (1  ) o   (1  )  1  2 o +4
= (1  )  1   1  2o + 1  1  2
m  3

3
= (1  ) 32o +

1  1  
2
m  3

3:
For S1; his expected payo¤ to be placed at E2 would be
(1  )o  3:
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To keep his position at E1; S1 is willing to bid
1 = 1   ((1  )o  3) = o   (1  )o +3 = 2o +3
= 2o +

1  1  
3
m  3

3:
Theorem 1 below establishes that bidding i is indeed an equilibrium strategy for Si;
i = 1; 2; 3; 4.
Theorem 1 Assume   max
n
2  1 ; 1 2 
o
  () : Then, the basic model has an equi-
librium in which seller Si bids to pay E
b1 = 
2o +

1  1 3m 3

3;
b2 = (1  ) 32o +

1  1 2m 3

3;
b3 =

1  1 3m 3

3;
bk =

1  1 2m 3

3; k = 4; : : : ;m;
(6)
S1, S2, S3 are placed at E1, E2, E3 and pay b2, b3; and b4; respectively. Each sellers price
is po; and each consumer searches and purchases as described in Lemma 1.
The proof for Theorem 1 is contained in the appendix. Basically, one needs to show that,
given the bids of other sellers, no seller can benet by bidding di¤erently from his equilibrium
bid. This involves showing that Sk; k = 4; : : : ;m would not want to bid su¢ ciently more
to be placed at E1; E2; or E3; that S3 neither would want to bid su¢ ciently more to be
placed at E2 or E1; nor would want to lower its bid to be not placed on E; and similarly
for S2 and S1: The additional parameter restriction provides a su¢ cient, but not necessary
condition (when m > 4); for such an equilibrium. Notice that this parameter restriction is
satised if   max12 ; 	 :
In the equilibrium characterized in Theorem 1, the search engine provides information
about the relevance of the products to consumers. It turns out that this is also the unique
equilibrium of the game, under a mild condition on consumers search behavior; namely
that consumers will search in the order of E1; E2; and E3 if they are indi¤erent between
alternative orders of search on E: The argument is as follows: First, there can be no
12
equilibrium in which S1; S2; S3 are placed on E but not in the order of E1; E2; E3: Suppose
to the contrary that there is such an equilibrium. Then, if a less relevant seller, say S3; bids
more and is placed at a higher position on E; consumers would optimally search the lower
placed but more relevant seller(s) before S3 at such an equilibrium (because consumers have
correct beliefs in equilibrium), which means that S3 could benet by lowering its bid and its
placement position on E; contradicting the equilibrium assumption. If, on the other hand,
all three sellers bid the same amount and are placed on E in random order, consumers would
have the same expected payo¤ from any order of search on E: But if in this case consumers
will search in the order of E1; E2; E3; any of the Si; i = 1; 2; 3; will have the incentive to
deviate by bidding a little more in order to be placed at the top, again contradicting the
equilibrium assumption. Next, there can be no equilibrium in which some Sk with k > 3; say
S4; is placed on E and S4 bids di¤erently from the other two sellers placed on E: Suppose
to the contrary that there is such an equilibrium. Then, S4 must bid at least as high as the
highest bidder not listed on E: But at such an equilibrium buyers would search randomly
from the sellers not on E; before searching S4; since the expected match probability from
sellers not listed on E would be higher than that of S4: This implies that S4 would benet
from a deviation that lowers his bid (or refrains from bidding) so that he will be placed
on E; contradicting the equilibrium assumption. Finally, it is straightforward to show that
there can also be no equilibrium in which some Sk with k > 3; say S4; is placed on E and
S4 bids the same amount as at least one other seller placed on E: We thus have:
Remark 1 Assume that consumers will search in the order of E1; E2; and E3 if they are
indi¤erent between alternative orders of search on E: Then the equilibrium characterized in
Theorem 1 is also the unique equilibrium of the game.
The restriction on consumer search behavior ensures the equilibrium uniqueness. If con-
sumers would search in random order on E when they are indi¤erent between alternative
orders of search on E; then it appears possible to have a partially pooling equilibrium,
where S1; S2; S3 bid the same amount, are placed with equal chance at E1; E2; E3; and con-
sumers search with equal chance of alternative orders on E: In the rest of the paper, we
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shall maintain the assumption on consumer search behavior in Remark 1, and focus on the
separatingequilibrium characterized in Theorem 1.
One way to evaluate the e¢ ciency property of paid-placement advertising is to see
how it impacts consumer search costs to achieve a given probability of nding a match.
With paid-placement advertising, for the match probability to be ; 1   (1  ) (1  ) ;
1  (1  ) (1  )  1  2 ; and 1  (1  ) (1  )  1  2  1  3 ; the consumer
needs to incur respectively t; 2t; 3t; and 4t: Without paid-placement advertising, and for
large m; the probability of a match from each search is approximately
1
m
 
1 +  + 2 + (m  3) 3  3:
The probability of achieving a match from  searches is approximately
1   1  3 :
Thus, to achieve any particular probability of match, the expected search times, or the
expected search cost, is lower under paid-placement advertising. In fact, one can easily see
that paid-placement advertising leads to an e¢ cient search procedure for the consumers.
Another way to evaluate the e¢ ciency property of paid-placement advertising is to see
how it impacts expected output. The expected output under paid-placement advertising is
qh =

1  (1  ) (1  )  1  2  1  3 [1  F (po)] ; (7)
while the expected output without paid-placement advertising is approximately
ql =
h
1   1  34i [1  F (po)] ; (8)
which is less than qh: We therefore have:
Corollary 1 Paid-placement advertising leads to an e¢ cient search procedure for con-
sumers, and to higher total output.
In equilibrium, the search engines prot is
E = b2 + b3 + b4
= (1  ) 32o +

1  1  
2
m  3

 +

1  1  
3
m  3

+

1  1  
2
m  3



3;
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or
E = (1  ) 32o + (m  4) (1  2) + 3
3
m  3 (1  ) (1  ) 
2o: (9)
Therefore, treating m as a continuous variable, we have:
@E
@m
=
 
1 + 2   33 (1  )(1  )2 o
(m  3)2 > 0; (10)
Also,
lim
m!1
@E
@
=
 
4   2   2 + 42   622 + 1 2o
=
 622 + 2  2 + 22   1   2 + 1 2o:
Solving
 622 + 2  2 + 22   1   2 + 1 = 0;
we obtain
^ () =
1
62

2 + 22   1 +
q
(2 + 22   1)2   62 (2   1)

; (11)
which increases in ; with lim!0 ^ () = 12 and lim!1 ^ () =
3+
p
3
6 :
Thus E has an inverted U-shape with respect to : it increases in  for  < ^ () and
decreases in  for  > ^ () :
Corollary 2 The search engines prot, E  b2 + b3 + b4, is strictly increasing in the
number of rms, m. Furthermore, when m is large and  () < ^ (), E is increasing in
the match probability  for  2 ( () ; ^ ()] but is decreasing in  for  2 (^ () ; 1):
As more sellers are present in the market, a seller is less likely to be selected randomly
by a buyer, and thus placement on the search engines recommended list is more valuable.
This motivates the sellers to bid more for placement, increasing the search engines revenue.
To see the non-monotonic relationship between the search engines revenue and sellers
relevance, notice that an increase in  has a positive e¤ect on the value of being placed
at E1; but has two opposite e¤ects on the value of being placed at E2 and E3: while
it increases the probability of match when a consumer visits the sellers website, it also
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reduces the probability that the consumer will visit E2 or E3; since the consumer is more
likely to purchase at E1: The balance of these e¤ects results in the search engines revenue
being rst increasing and then decreasing in :7
In sum, Section 3 analyzes the fundamental properties of the paid-placement mechanism.
We show that it is optimal for the search engine to place the most relevant rms on its list in
descending order. As such, paid-placement advertising improves consumer welfare and en-
hances rmsprots. Our analysis also sheds light on the search engines prot. Specically,
the search engine should recruit as many rms as possible into the paid-placement mecha-
nism. In addition, it is optimal for the search engine to restrict the precision of keywords
such that the resulting match probability is not too high. Our model is most applicable
to products characterized by a high degree of horizontal di¤erentiation and limited price
dispersion, i.e., product categories where product variety is large and similar items do not
di¤er substantially in price, such as watches, jeweleries, computers, etc.
4. HETEROGENEOUS COSTS
Our basic model has the property that in equilibrium all sellers charge the same price, po.
In this section, we make a simple modication to our model that would allow us to generate
price dispersion in equilibrium. The modication is that, instead of assuming the same cost
for all sellers, we now assume that sellers may have di¤erent costs. More specically, we
assume that each sellers constant marginal cost ci is the realization of a random variable
distributed on [c; c] ; with cdf and pdf G () and g () ; respectively; and each seller learns its
cost realization after bidding on E:8
7Our model assumes that  is given exogenously. If the search engine can a¤ect the value of  by, say, the
selection of key words, our analysis suggests that the search engine should choose  at some intermediate
level to maximize its revenue.
8This way, bidding by sellers does not signal sellers costs (prices), allowing us to focus on the role of
paid-placement advertising in signaling product relevance. We are not aware of evidence suggesting that
sellers with paid-placement advertising have systematically higher or lower costs (prices), and under our
formulation all sellers have the same expected price in equilibrium.
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For any ci 2 [c; c] ; let
po (ci) = arg max
p2[c;u]
(p  ci) [1  F (p)] ; (12)
~o =
cZ
c
(po (c)  c) [1  F (po (c))] dG (c) : (13)
Then, if seller i is listed as E1; its expected prot is i~
o; provided that consumers rst
visit E1:
We modify assumption A2 to assume
A20:

cZ
c
[po (c)  po (c)] g (c) dc < t < 3
cZ
c
264 vZ
po(c)
[v   po (c)] f (v) dv
375 g (c) dc < th:
A20 requires that the cost dispersion is not too large, so that in equilibrium a consumer
stops searching once she nds her desired product, and she does not search more than four
times. Notice that A20 becomes A2 when [c; c] converges to a constant c:
We again look for the equilibrium in which paid-placement conveys information about
the sellersproduct relevance.
First, suppose that S1, S2, S3 are placed at E1, E2, E3; respectively, and Sk are not
placed on E0s list, k = 4; : : : ;m: Suppose further that each seller prices at po (ci) : Then,
it is optimal for consumers to search sequentially, in the order of E1; E2; E3; and then
randomly chosen non-listed sellers. If a consumer nds her desired product at a particular
seller; her expected return from having another search cannot exceed

cZ
c
[po (c)  po (c)] g (c) dc;
which is less than t by assumption. On the other hand, conditional on having not found a
match, a consumers expected return from searching a non-listed seller is
3
cZ
c
264 vZ
po(c)
[v   po (c)] f (v) dv
375 g (c) dc;
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which is larger than t but less than th by assumption. Therefore, given the suggested
placement of sellers and their prices, it is optimal for each consumer to search sequentially
at most four sellers, in the order of E1; E2; E3; and a randomly chosen non-listed seller; she
stops searching either when she nds a match or when she has searched four times; and she
makes a purchase if she nds a match and her v is at or above the sellers price:
Next, given the search and purchase behavior of consumers, it is optimal for Si to set
po (ci) : Hence, at the time of bidding for placement, the expected prot of Si from any
consumer who visits Si is simply ~o:
Finally, to establish the equilibrium, we need to show that each seller bids optimally
and the bidding by the sellers indeed results in the proposed order of placement under the
second price auction. At the proposed equilibrium, the expected prots of Si, excluding
their payments to E; are
~1 = ~
o;
~2 = (1  ) ~o = (1  ) ~1;
~3 = (1  ) (1  ) 2~o = (1  ) ~2;
~k =
1
m 3
 
1  2 (1  ) (1  ) 3~o = 1 2m 3 ~3; for k = 4; : : : ;m:
(14)
If S4 is placed at E3; his expected prot would be
(1  ) (1  ) 3~o:
Thus S4 is willing to bid
~4 = (1  ) (1  ) 3~o  
(1  ) (1  )  1  2
m  3 
3~o =

1  1  
2
m  3

~3
to be placed at E3: On the other hand, to keep his position at E3; S3 is willing to bid
~3 = ~3   (1  ) (1  )
 
1  3 2
m  3 ~
o =

1  1  
3
m  3

~3:
Similarly, as in our earlier analysis where all sellers have the same constant marginal cost,
to keep their positions at E2 and E1; S2 and S1 are willing to bid, respectively,
~2 = (1  ) 32~o +

1  1  
2
m  3

~3;
~1 = 
2~o +

1  1  
3
m  3

~3:
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Therefore, analogous to Theorem 1, we have:
Theorem 2 Assume that   max
n
2  1 ; 1 2 
o
: Then, the game with heterogeneous
seller costs has an equilibrium in which seller Si bids to pay E
b1 = 
2~o +

1  1 3m 3

~3;
b2 = (1  ) 32~o +

1  1 2m 3

~3;
b3 =

1  1 3m 3

~3;
bk =

1  1 2m 3

~3; k = 4; : : : ;m;
(15)
S1, S2, S3 are placed at E1, E2, E3 and pay b2, b3; and b4; respectively. Si charges price
po (ci) : Each consumer searches sequentially, in the order of E1, E2, E3; and then a ran-
domly selected non-listed seller; stops searching further when she nds a match or has
searched four sellers; and purchases if the price of the product that matches her needs does
not exceed her valuation for the product.
The proof of Theorem 2 is entirely the same as the proof of Theorem 1 in the appendix,
except replacing o and 3 there by ~o and ~3: Notice that in equilibrium sellers tend to
have di¤erent prices, depending on the realization of their costs, and the expected price of
each seller is
~p =
cZ
c
po (c) dG (c) :
In the literature, price dispersion is often generated in models with mixed strategies,
where some consumers purchase only from particular sellers (due to loyalty or imperfect
information) while other consumers purchase only from the seller with the lowest prices (e.g.,
Baye and Morgan, 2001; Janseen and Moraga-Gonsález, 2004; Rosenthal, 1980; and Varian,
1980). An important exception is Reinganum (1979), where a price distribution is generated
by a set of rms with di¤erent marginal costs choosing pure strategies. Our model in this
section has followed the approach of Reinganum in considering possibly di¤erent marginal
costs for di¤erent rms. Unlike her model, where in equilibrium each consumer only searches
once, consumers engage in sequential search here because rms sell di¤erentiated products
and each consumer searches for the variety matching her preference.
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5. CONCLUSION
One of the great promises of the Internet is its e¢ ciency in disseminating information.
More information, however, can be a mixed blessing for consumers, as evidenced by, for
instance, the intrusion of junk e-mails to our lives. For the Internet to be a benecial
medium, therefore, the information it delivers should go to consumers who exhibit such
information needs. More specically, e¢ ciency requires that consumers who search for
information receive information from the most relevant sources. Indeed, the ability to deliver
relevant information to consumers who search for information is unique to the Internet. Such
characteristics may exist in other media but are far more costly.
Paid-placement advertising, where a search engine acts as an intermediary between rms
and consumers, facilitates the transmission of information from rms to consumers and has
enjoyed phenomenal commercial successes. This paper has developed a market equilibrium
model that uncovers the economic forces behind the success of this important Internet
institution. When consumers must engage in costly search to nd their desired product
variety, they face the issue of how to search various sellers, who carry di¤erent product
varieties. Advertising through paid placement enables sellers to reveal information about
their product relevance to consumers: A seller with a more relevant product expects a
higher probability of a sale from the visit of a consumer to the sellers website, and hence
a higher expected prot from attracting such a visiting consumer; this motivates the seller
to bid more and to receive a higher ad placement position. Moreover, since consumers
do not learn a sellers price until visiting the sellers website, in equilibrium the expected
price from each seller is the same. Therefore, it is optimal for consumers to search sellers
sequentially, according to their placement on the search engines list. In equilibrium, paid
placement advertising leads to e¢ cient search by consumers and higher total output. Our
analysis also sheds light on the search engines strategies. In particular, we demonstrate that
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the search engines prot and relevance,
implying that the search engines prot is maximized when the keyword relevance is set at
some intermediate level.
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As is well-known in the literature (Diamond, 1971), with costly consumer search a market
with many rms may nevertheless sustain a single monopoly price. This is also the case in
our model when all sellers have the same marginal cost. When sellers ex post have di¤erent
marginal costs, there is price dispersion in the equilibrium of our model, even though each
seller still sets a monopoly price based on his realized marginal cost. The fact that the
next seller a consumer searches may not o¤er the product match she desires diminishes
her expected return from searching further for a lower price. Consequently, under the
assumption that the cost (price) dispersion is relatively small, a consumer will not search
further once she has found her desired product.
There are several directions for future research. One possibility is to allow competition
among search engines, which could a¤ect the bidding incentives of sellers and could address
issues such as whether competition will lead to the adoption of e¢ cient information dis-
semination mechanisms. A strong assumption in our model when we allow sellers to have
di¤erent marginal costs is that sellers learn their costs after they place bids to the search
engine. It would be desirable to relax this assumptions in future research. While we nd
a model with equilibrium price dispersion under pure strategies interesting, future research
could explore other models of price dispersion, possibly with mixed strategies. Furthermore,
it would also be interesting to empirically evaluate the assumptions and implications of our
analysis. For instance, our analysis predicts that sellers placed higher by a search engine
for a keyword search will have higher expected sales for the product, which is empirically
testable.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. Given the placement of S1, S2, S3 at E1, E2, E3 and each
sellers price po; each consumers search and purchase behavior is optimal. Given consumer
behavior, each sellers price is optimal. Thus, our proof will be complete if it is shown that
no seller can benet from bidding di¤erently. Since it is a second price auction, we need
only be concerned with deviations by Si that would change the placement of Si: Let 
j
i be
seller i0s payo¤ at position Ej ; including i0s payment to E:
First consider S4. In order to be placed at E3; S4 needs to bid at least b3; and his expected
payo¤ at E3; after paying b3; is
34 = (1  ) (1  ) 3o  

1  1  
3
m  3

3 = 3  

1  1  
3
m  3

3:
On the other hand, the expected prot of S4 not to be on E is 4 =
1 2
m 3 3: We have
34   4 = 3  

1  1  
3
m  3

3   1  
2
m  3 3 =  
(1  ) (m  4)
(m  3) 3  0
where the inequality holds strictly if m > 4: Hence, S4 has no incentive to switch position
with S3:
Similarly, we have
24   4 = (1  ) 3o  

(1  ) 32o +

1  1  
2
m  3

3

  1  
2
m  3 3
= (1  )2 3o   3 = (1  )2 3o    (1  ) (1  ) 2o
=   (1  ) (1  ) 32o < 0;
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and
14   4 = 3o  

2o +

1  1  
3
m  3

3

  1  
2
m  3 3
=
 
2    o   1  1  3
m  3 +
1  2
m  3 

3
=
 
2    o   m+    4
m  3 (1  ) (1  ) 
2o
=
 
2    o   (1  ) (1  ) 2o + 1  
m  3 (1  ) (1  ) 
2o
= o
 
2     (1  ) (1  ) + 1  
m  3 (1  ) (1  ) 

= o

  (1  )

1  (1  ) (1  )
m  3

+ 

 + 2 (1  )  1
< 0
if
1   [1 +  (1  )] ;
which holds if   max
n
2  1 ; 1 2 
o
: It follows that S4 has no incentive to switch position
with S2 or S1:Thus S4 cannot benet from any deviation.
Next, consider S3: If S3 switches position with S4; its payo¤ would be 43; while its payo¤
at E3; after paying E; is 3   b4: We have:
43   [3   b4]
=
1
m  3
 
1  3 (1  ) (1  ) 2o   3   1  1  2
m  3

3

=
1
m  3
 
1  3 (1  ) (1  ) 2o
 

1 

1  1  
2
m  3



(1  ) (1  ) 2o
=   1
m  3 (m  4) (1  ) (1  ) (1  ) (
o)2 < 0;
Hence, S3 has no incentive to switch position with S4: Similarly, we have
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23   [3   b4] =

(1  ) 2o   (1  ) 32o  

1  1  
2
m  3

3

 

3  

1  1  
2
m  3

3

= (1  ) 2o   (1  ) 32o   (1  ) (1  ) 2o = 0;
and
13   [3   b4]
= 2o   2o  

1  1  
3
m  3

3  

3  

1  1  
2
m  3

3

= 2o   2o  

1  1  
3
m  3 + 1 

1  1  
2
m  3



3
= 2o   2o + m   4   2m+ 7
m  3 (1  ) (1  ) 
2o
= 2o   2o +   (m  3) (2  ) + 1  
m  3 (1  ) (1  ) 
2o
= 2o   2o   (2  ) (1  ) (1  ) 2o + 1  
m  3 (1  ) (1  ) 
2o
 2o   2o   (2  ) (1  ) (1  ) 2o + (1  ) (1  ) (1  ) 2o
=  2 (o)  2   2    + 1  0
if
1   [1 +  (1  )] :
It follows that S3 has no incentive to switch position with S2 or S1:Thus S3 cannot benet
from any deviation.
Next, consider S2: If S2 switches position with S4; its payo¤ would be 42; while its payo¤
at E2; after paying E; is 2   b3: We have:
42   [2   b3] =
1
m  3
 
1  3  1  2 (1  ) o
 

(1  ) o  

1  1  
3
m  3

(1  ) (1  ) 2o

=
 1
m  3
 
(m  4) (1  ) + (m  3)2 + 3 (1  ) (1  )o < 0:
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Hence, S2 has no incentive to switch position with S4: Similarly, we have
32   [2   b3]
=
 
1  2 (1  ) o   b4   [2   b3]
=
 
1  2 (1  ) o   1  1  2
m  3

3  

(1  ) o  

1  1  
3
m  3

3

=
 
1  2 (1  ) o   (1  ) o   1  1  2
m  3

  

1  1  
3
m  3

3
=
 
1  2 (1  ) o   (1  ) o + m  4
m  3 (1  ) (1  ) (1  ) 
2o
<
 
1  2 (1  ) o   (1  ) o + (1  ) (1  ) (1  ) 2o
= 2 (1  )  2   2    + 1o  0
if
 [1 +  (2  )]  1;
which holds if   max
n
2  1 ; 1 2 
o
: Furthermore,
12   [2   b3]
= o   2o  

1  1  
3
m  3

3  

(1  ) o  

1  1  
3
m  3

3

= o   2o   (1  ) o = 0
It follows that S2 has no incentive to switch position with S3 or S1: Thus S2 cannot benet
from any deviation.
Finally, consider S1: If S1 switches position with S4; its payo¤ would be 41; while its
payo¤ at E1; after paying E; is 1   b2: We have:
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41   [1   b2]
=
1
m  3
 
1  3  1  2 (1  )o   o + (1  ) 32o + 1  1  2
m  3

3
=  o + (1  ) 32o +  (1  ) (1  ) 2o +
1
m  3
 
1  3  1  2 (1  )o   1  2
m  3  (1  ) (1  ) 
2o

=  (o)
 
3   4   23 + 24   1+  1  2 (1  )   + 2 + 1 (1  )o
m  3
  (o)  3   4   23 + 24   1+  2   1 (   1)   + 2 + 1 (1  )o
=  2 (o)     4 + 1  3 + 5 < 0:
Hence, S1 has no incentive to switch position with S4: Similarly, we have
31   [1   b2] =
 
1  2 (1  )o   b4   [1   b2]
=
 
1  2 (1  )o   1  1  2
m  3

3   o
+(1  ) 32o +

1  1  
2
m  3

3
=  2 (o)  1 +    2 < 0
21   [1   b2]
= (1  )o   b3   [1   b2]
= (1  )o  

1  1  
3
m  3

3   o + (1  ) 32o +

1  1  
2
m  3

3
= (1  )o   o + (1  ) 32o  

1  1  
3
m  3

3 +

1  1  
2
m  3

3
=  2 (o)  2   2 + 1  m  4
m  3 (1  ) (1  ) (1  ) 
2o < 0:
It follows that S1 has no incentive to switch position with S3 or S2:Thus S1 cannot benet
from any deviation.
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In sum, none of the sellers can benet from any deviation when   max
n
2  1 ; 1 2 
o
:
Our proof is thus complete.
Q.E.D.
27
REFERENCES
[1] Anderson, S. and R. Renault. 2006. Advertising Content." The American Economic Re-
view. 96(1) 96113.
[2] Bagwell, K. and G. Ramey. 1994. Coordination economies, advertising, and search behavior
in retail markets." The American Economic Review. 84(3) 498517.
[3] Baye, M. and J. Morgan. 2001. Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Compet-
itiveness of Homogeneous Product Markers." The American Economic Review. 91(3)
454474.
[4] Chen, Y. 2000. Strategic Bidding by Potential Competitors: Will Monopoly Persist?" Jour-
nal of Industrial Economics. 48(2) 161175.
[5] Coy, P. 2006. The Secret To Googles Success: Its innovative auction system has ad rev-
enues soaring." Business Week. March 6, 2006.
[6] Diamond, P. A. 1971. A Model of Price Adjustment." Journal of Economic Theory. 3(2)
156168.
[7] Edelman, B., M. Ostrovsky, M. Schwarz. 2005. Internet Advertising and the Generalized
Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords."Working Paper.
Stanford University.
[8] Frangos, A. 2002. A Consumers Guide Advice: Web Watch." Wall Street Journal. De-
cember 9, 2002.
[9] Grossman, G. M. and C. Shapiro. 1984. Informative advertising with di¤erentiated prod-
ucts." Review of Economic Studies. 51(1) 6381.
[10] He, C. and Y. Chen. 2006. Managing e-Marketplace: A Strategic Analysis of Nonprice
Advertising." Marketing Science. 25(2) 175187.
28
[11] Iyer, G. and A. Pazgal. 2003. Internet Shopping Agents: Virtual Co-Location And Com-
petition." Marketing Science. 22(1) 85106.
[12] Janseen, M. and J. L. Moraga-Gonsález. 2004. Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and
the Number of Firms." The Review of Economic Studies. 71(4) 10891118.
[13] Krishna, K. 1993. Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: The Persistence of Monopoly
Revisited." The American Economic Review. 83(1) 14760.
[14] Lal, R. and M. Sarvary. 1999. When and How is Internet Likely to Decrease Price Com-
petition.Marketing Science. 18(4) 485503.
[15] Lewis, T. 1983. Preemption, Divestiture, and Forward Contracting in a Market Dominated
by a Single Firm." The American Economic Review, 73(5) 10921101.
[16] Meurer, M. and D. O. Stahl. 1994. Informative advertising and product match." Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization. 12(1) 119.
[17] Nelson, P. 1974. Advertising as information." Journal of Political Economy. 82(4) 729754.
[18] Reinganum, J. F. 1979. A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion." Journal of
Political Economy. 87(4) 851858.
[19] Rosenthal, R. W. 1980. A Model in Which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to
a Higher Price." Econometrica. 48(6) 15751579.
[20] Satagopan, S., D. Card, N. Soevak, and G. Stein. 2005 US Paid Search Forecast, 2005 to
2010." Online Search. 3 114. Published by Jupitermedia Corporation.
[21] Thibodeau, S. 2004. What you need to know about Pay for Placement." Rank for $ales
Research Report. June 18, 2004.
[22] Varian, H. 1980. A Model of Sales." The American Economic Review. 70(4) 651659.
[23] Zettelmeyer, F., F. Scott-Morton, and J. Risso. 2001. Internet Car Retailing.Journal of
Industrial Economics. 49(4) 501519.
29
